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Education, Information, and Improved Health: 
Evidence from Breast Cancer Screening 
 
While it is well known that education strongly predicts health, less is known as to why. One 
reason might be that education improves health-care decision making. In this paper we 
attempt to disentangle improved decision making from other effects of education, and to 
quantify how large an impact it has on both a patient’s demand for health services, and that 
demand’s sensitivity to objective risk factors. We do this by estimating a simple structural 
model of information acquisition and health decisions for data on women’s self-reported 
breast-cancer risk and screening behavior. This allows us to separately identify differences in 
the ability to process health information and differences in overall demand for health. Our 
results suggest that the observed education gradient in screening stems from a higher 
willingness-to-pay for health among the educated, but that the main reason why the educated 
respond more to risk factors in their screening decision is because they are much better 
informed about the risk factors they face. 
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 1 Introduction:
The fact that education and health are extremely correlated represents one
of the fundamental facts in health economics. This link between education
and health is so close that Grossman and Kaestner (1997) suggest that ed-
ucation may be the most important socioeconomic correlate of good health.
A number of explanations have been o⁄ered to explain this tight correlation.
Education raises incomes and consequently expenditures on health as long
as health is a normal good. In turn, healthy individuals can expect longer
life-spans and thus can expect to bene￿t more from investing into education.
Furthermore, health and education will be a⁄ected in similar ways as the
discount rate varies, because health and education both represent invest-
ments into the future. Grossman￿ s (1972) seminal model of health capital
shows how education and health are linked for all of these reasons, but
also hypothesizes that education may directly enable individuals to produce
health capital more e⁄ectively. That is, might education directly improve
the e¢ ciency of health investments by improving an individual￿ s health-care
decision making?
Plausibly, the educated are more e¢ cient at investing into health because
they know more about health, and hold an advantage in processing health
information. If the educated process health information more e⁄ectively,
they would allocate health resources more e⁄ectively and thus produce more
health from the same amount of resources. This hypothesis is known as the
allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis of education in health investments.
To date however, the empirical evidence in support of the allocative e¢ -
ciency hypothesis is largelylimited by a fundamental identi￿cation problem;
Do more highly educated individuals make di⁄erent health-related choices
because they value health di⁄erently or because they di⁄er in their knowl-
edge about the consequences of their choices.
Two interesting studies by de Walque (2004a, 2004b) illustrate this dif-
￿culty in the context of two very di⁄erent environments. In both of these
studies, de Walque (2004a, 2004b) ￿nds that new information on health
induces faster and more pronounced responses among the educated. De
2Walque (2004a) ￿nds that as new information about smoking risks became
available in the 1950s and 1960s, the more educated quit smoking at higher
rates than did the less educated. De Walque (2004b) documents a simi-
lar pattern in sexual behaviors in Uganda as the HIV epidemic unfolded.1
These ￿ndings are consistent the notion that more educated individuals
process new medical information more e¢ ciently and adjust more rapidly to
this new information. However, the same patterns in behavior are consistent
with the hypothesis that no di⁄erences in health knowledge exist between
the educated and uneducated, but that the educated respond more to the
new information because they have more elastic demand for health. Indeed,
the greater drop in smoking rates observed in the US since the 1950s and the
more pronounced decline in risky sexual behaviors among the educated in
Uganda are consistent with nearly every theory which links education and
health.
More direct evidence for the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis comes from
Kenkel (1991a, 1991b). Kenkel showed that when surveyed, more educated
individuals are better informed about the health risks associated with smok-
ing, drinking and lack of exercise. He also ￿nds that those who are aware of
the speci￿c health risks associated with these risk factors are more likely to
abstain from smoking, drinking, and to exercise. To our knowledge Kenkel
(1991a, 1991b) was the ￿rst to show that health knowledge correlates both
with education and with health behaviors. As such, these papers provide the
closest direct con￿rmation of the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis.2 However,
these papers do not provide information on whether the allocative e¢ ciency
hypothesis is quantitatively important relative to education-driven increases
in the demand for health. That is, current studdies do not let us judge ade-
quately whether di⁄erences in the ability to process health information have
large quantitative implications for health care decisions.
1Prior to the spread of AIDS, educated men in Uganda tended to have more sexual
partners than those with less education. However, by the early 1990s, educated men were
among the ￿rst to adjust their sexual behavior and reduce the number of sexual partners
as well as the incidence of unprotected sex.
2Kenkel (2000) provides an excellent survey of the empirical evidence for the allocative
e¢ ciency hypothesis.
3At the same time, it has become increasingly relevant to understand
whether constraints in the ability to process health information among the
less educated are large. Modern medicine can treat or manage an increasing
number of diseases. Yet, modern medical care often requires patients to
adhere to complex treatment schedules and patients face many bewildering
options. If the skills required to negotiate the modern health care system are
partially aquired through education, then lack of education will increasingly
constrain patients ability to participate in the gains from medical progress.
The interaction between the lack of skills relevant for health choices and
continuing medical progress might therefore partially explain why health is
increasingly unequally distributed (see Cutler, Meara, and Richards (2008)).
If policy makers want to expand the bene￿ts of modern medical care to the
less educated, they need to understand whether the less educated achieve
worse heath outcomes because they can￿ t a⁄ord health care, or because they
lack the relevant health-care knowledge and decision making skills.
Furthermore, health care expenditures now comprise an unprecedented
share of GDP. At the same time relatively cheap ways of improving health
and longevity seem underutilized; few individuals receive ￿ u shots, despite
the fact that more than 200,000 people are hospitalized for ￿ u complications
a year, and around 36,000 of those die (CDC http://www.cdc.gov/￿ u/keyfacts.htm).
Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2007) estimate that each additional year of school-
ing increases the probability of receiving a ￿ u shot by 1.7 percentage points,
suggesting that education may be key to increasing the utilization of cost-
e⁄ective preventative care and screening.
In this paper, we use data from Cancer Screening and from subjective
statements about cancer risks to provide new qualitative and quantitative
evidence on the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis. In particular, we exam-
ine whether the educated are better informed about their individual risks
for developing cancer. We start from the observation that those who are
better informed about their risk will be more responsive to the presence of
risk factors both in their self-reported risk status and in their demand for
preventative health care. Simply observing the variation in the demand for
health with risk factors will however not be su¢ cient to distinguish between
4allocative e¢ ciency and other competing explanations for the link between
education and heatlh. In Section 2, we discuss this identi￿cation probelm
more formally.
We then present (Section 3) reduced form evidence that educated women
are more responsive to the presence of risk factors when reporting their
subjective risk of developing breast cancer.3 We also show that educated
women respond more to risk factors when they decide whether to be screened
for cancer. Together these two ￿ndings suggest that education enhances
allocative e¢ ciency. The ￿nding that risk factors also a⁄ect screening more
among the educated documents the relevance for behavior. However, the
reduced form evidence does not enable us to quantify directly how large a
role di⁄erences in the ability to process health information by education play
in generating di⁄erences in health behavior. If we want to quantify the role
of education in enhancing allocative e¢ ciency, then we need to specify and
estimate a model of health information and decisions. We specify a simple
model of health information and demand in Section 4. Our model allows for
both di⁄erences in the ability to process information and for di⁄erences in
the willingness-to-pay for health improvements across education levels. In
Section 5, we estimate both the demand parameters and the parameters of
the information model using data on subjective risk assessments, objective
risk factors and cancer screening decisions.
Our estimates suggest that allocative e¢ ciency indeed plays an impor-
tant role in generating di⁄erences in screening behavior across education
groups. We ￿nd that almost the entire di⁄erences in the responsiveness
of cancer screening decisions across education groups are driven by di⁄er-
ences in the ability to process information. Yet, this ￿nding should not be
misconstrued to mean that the observed health gradients are entirely due
to di⁄erences in allocative e¢ ciency. Indeed, the estimate from our model
imply that the observed di⁄erences in the ability to process information ac-
3We pay particular attention to breast cancer because there exists a well developed
medical risk model for breast cancer screening. However, we also show results from other
cancers and in particular colorectal cancer that are consistent with our reduced form
￿ndings from breast cancer.
5count for very little of the observed overall gradient in screening. Instead,
the overall gradient in screening with education is primarily driven by dif-
ferences in the demand for health across education groups. Overall, our
results suggest that the impact of di⁄erences in allocative e¢ ciency on the
overall health gradient depend on the particularities of the health decision
considered. For breast cancer screening, we ￿nd that allocative e¢ ciency
can not explain why less educated screen at much lower rates than the more
educated. However, our results also imply that di⁄erences in the ability
to process information do indeed play a quantitatively important role in
determining observed health behaviors.
2 The Identi￿cation Problem: Separating Varia-
tion in Subjective Mortality Risk from the De-
mand for Health
Ultimately, empirical research needs to strive to both test and quantify how
important the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis is for generating observed dif-
ferences in health behaviors across education. Empirical researchers face
the di¢ culty to separately identify how important information and demand
based explanations are; this problem can not be overcome based only on
observed di⁄erences in health behaviors across education. Instead, we re-
quire additional information that allows us to either identify the demand
for health or the distribution of information in the population from another
source. In this section, we strive to clarify the problem faced by empirical
researchers.
To build intuition, consider how smoking trends have varied with edu-
cation over the last half century and whether we can learn about di⁄erences
in the ability to process health information from these di⁄erential trends
in smoking across education. During the 1950s and early 1960s, evidence
based health research revealed the considerable health risks associated with
smoking, and numerous public health campaigns sought to inform the pub-
lic of these risks. As demonstrated by De Walque (2004) using the NHIS,
6over that period individuals with higher levels of education quit smoking at
higher rates. Prior to 1950, education and smoking were positively corre-
lated, but by 1960 the less educated were smoking at higher rates than the
more educated.
The fundamental problem we face is to determine why the educated re-
sponded more rapidly to the new information. There are several reasons
why the gradient between education and smoking reversed. On the demand
side, the educated may naturally place a higher monetary value on survival
and hence face greater incentives to quit smoking once smoking is commonly
known to be harmful. Similarly, those with higher discount rates may have
both valued education and health more highly. Consequently, those with
higher discount rates may have both invested more in education and quit
smoking at higher rates as new information on the health e⁄ects of smoking
became available. Alternatively, education may have been positively corre-
lated with either the exposure to or the more rapid absorption of new health
research. This information e⁄ect would likewise induce the educated to quit
smoking at higher rates than the less educated. The observed implications
of the information and the demand e⁄ect on smoking rates is the same.
To illustrate this identi￿cation problem formally, we start from a simple
model of health decisions, and show why observational data on health deci-
sions alone does not reveal whether education improves allocative e¢ ciency.
Individuals make a mortality relevant and costly dichotomous decision rep-
resented by ￿ 2 f0;1g. Each alternative is associated with a ￿nancial cost
fc0;i;c1;ig and a subjective survival probability fe ￿0;i;e ￿1;ig: Subjective sur-
vival probabilities are denoted with tildas to di⁄erentiate them from objec-
tive survival probabilities f￿0;i;￿1;ig:The costs and also the subjective (and
objective) survival probabilities attached to each alternative vary across in-
dividuals. Let ￿ci = c1;i ￿c0;i and ￿e ￿i = e ￿1;i ￿ e ￿0;irepresent the di⁄erence
in costs and the gain in survival associated with each alternative and write
￿ci = ￿c + "i:
The decision can then be represented as:
￿ = 1 , V SL￿e ￿i ￿ ￿c ￿ "i (1)
7Here the parameter VSL represents the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween survival and consumption. This parameter is known as the Value of
a Statistical Life. For simplicity, I will assume that the individual hetero-
geneity in costs "i is independent of all other variables. This heterogeneity
is distributed with F":
The typical data-set will contain data on health behaviors and sometimes
information on the objective risks that individuals face. We also assume that
education e and potentially other relevant control variables x are observed.
To simplify the problem even further, assume that the demand parameters
(V SL;￿c) vary with education and x, but not with the objective risk ￿:
Thus, let (V SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)) represent the Value of a Statistical life and
the average cost of the health decision conditional on the education and the
variables x observable in the data.
The data therefore allows us to identify
Pr(￿ = 1jx;e;￿￿) =
Z
(1 ￿ F" (V SL(e;x)￿ ￿ ￿c(e;x)))g (￿j￿￿;e;x)d￿
(2)
Here, g(:j￿￿;e;x) represents the density of subjective survival gains ￿e ￿
conditional on the objective gains ￿￿ as well as (e;x): Clearly, any ob-
served di⁄erences in health decisions with education can be reconciled with
subjective beliefs about survival gains that are common across education
g(:j￿￿;e;x) = g (:j￿￿;x) by appropriate choice of the demand parameters
fV SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)g: Similarly, by appropriately choosing g(:j￿￿;e;x) we
can reconcile any observed patterns in health choices across observable char-
acteristic with arbitrary values of fV SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)g:
Consider the ￿ndings of De Walque (2004a) in this light. He showed
that smoking rates among those with high levels of education declined more
rapidly as it became known that smoking was dangerous. This ￿nding is
of course consistent with the assumption that g(:j￿￿;e;x) changed more
rapidly among the more educated. Since the more educated updated their
subjective risk assessments about the dangers of smoking more rapidly as the
new information on health risks became available, smoking rates among the
more educated started to decline earlier and more rapidly among them. The
8allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis therefore is consistent with the observed facts
about smoking in the last 50 years. However, these facts are also consistent
with the hypothesis that both the educated and the less educated learned
about smoking risks at the same time and that the more educated simply
reacted more strongly to this information because they attached higher val-
uations (V SL(e;x)) to survival. The educated quit at higher rates as new
information about the health risks of smoking became available, but not
because they were more aware of the harmful e⁄ects of smoking. The ob-
served trends in smoking thus illustrate the problem of identifying the role
of information processing and demand di⁄erences in health decisions using
observational data only.
A similar problem arises if we want to exploit observed variation in how
screening rates vary with risk factors and education. The di⁄erences in how
responsive the educated are to variation in objective risks might be due
to variation in the pdf of subjective beliefs g (￿e ￿j￿￿;e;x) or due to varia-
tion in the demand parameters (V SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)): We can not separately
identify the information and the demand contribution to the di⁄erences in
screening behavior without imposing further restrictions.
One possibility to make progress is to assume that we have information
about the demand parameters (V SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)) from other sources. For
instance, we might specify how the demand for health is related to con-
sumption and income (e.g. Murphy and Topel (2007)) and then use data
on consumption and incomes across education as well as the costs of screen-
ing to link and subject￿ s VSL and education. This approach requires a lot
of information on health demands. Empirical estimates on the Value of a
Statistical Life are very imprecise and even less is known on how the VSL
varies with education. Furthermore, it is often very di¢ cult to estimate
the full costs of health decisions. In the case of the smoking example we
would need to measure the value attached to smoking by smokers. For the
screening example below, the full costs of screening for cancer include costs
that arise because of physical and psychological pain and su⁄ering associ-
ated with screening and with various diagnostic procedures associated with
screening. Furthermore, if the health decisions are dichotomous decisions,
9then we typically also need the variance of the cost ￿c + "i across individ-
uals. The data at our disposal has relatively little information about the
costs of screening, nor about consumption or incomes of individuals.
An alternative is to try to measure the subjective risk. It is this avenue
that we exploit in this paper. The reason why we are able to make progress
along these line is because the National Health and Interview Survey (NHIS)
of 2005 has collected unique data on both objective and subjective risks. We
specify an information model that allows us to estimate the joint distribution
G(￿￿;￿e ￿je;x) of subjective and objective risk conditional education e and
x from subjective risk statements provided by respondents to the NHIS
and measures of their objective risk. Based on this estimated distribution
and on the observed variation in screening behavior, we can then estimate
the demand parameters (V SL(e;x);￿c(e;x)). The estimated parameters
of the information model and the demand parameters together allow us
to deduce how much of the variation in screening behavior with objective
risk, education and other variables is attributable to di⁄erences in the way
educated and less educated individuals process information and how much
of it can be attributed to demand di⁄erences.
Before we turn to this structural estimation exercise, we will however
￿rst provide a detailed description of the data including an extensive reduced
form analysis of the data.
3 Reduced Form Evidence from Cancer Screening
and Subjective Cancer Risk
In the previous Section, that observational data on health behavior alone
does not su¢ ce to test or quantify the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis. In
this Section, we introduce reduced form evidence from both cancer screening
behavior and from subjective risk assessments related to cancer to provide
qualitative evidence on the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis.
We examine whether education changes the way individuals respond to
the presence of risk factors when they assess their subjective cancer risk
10and also when they decide to screen for cancer. We show that as objective
risk of developing cancer increases, educated individuals are di⁄erentially
more likely to report that they are of high cancer risk. Furthermore, risk
factors are also di⁄erentially more likely to induce educated rather than
uneducated individuals to undergo cancer screening. Both these empirical
facts are consistent with the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis that education
raises awareness of risk factors and thus enables individuals to make better
health decisions.
3.1 Data
We are able to go beyond the existing empirical literature on the alloca-
tive e¢ ciency hypothesis because of the rich data on subjective cancer risks,
objective cancer risks and cancer screening made available through the Na-
tional Health and Interview Survey (NHIS). The NHIS collected individual
assessments of subjective cancer risks for Breast Cancer and for Colorec-
tal Cancer in its cancer control module in 2005. In addition, the NHIS
cancer control modules recorded screening choices made by individuals and
also recorde a number of variables that allow us to implement a well known
model of breast cancer risk prominent in the medical literature. We do not
have a similar risk model for the other cancers in the data. For that reason
our analysis focuses on breast cancer.
3.1.1 The Gail Index
We use the Gail index, a standard medically accepted measure of breast
cancer risk to measure the objective risk factors faced by individuals. The
Gail Index is a function of the family history of cancer, of the number of
positive screening results a woman has had so far, of the age at menarche,
of the fertility history of a woman, and of her age. Table 1 summarizes
how one can construct the Gail index to construct individual relative cancer
risk. The information about breast cancer risk summarized by the Gail
model goes beyond a list of risk factors and also includes the size of the
impact of these risk factors and the interaction with other risk factors.
11[Table 1]
Table 1 shows how to obtain the relative risk of developing breast cancer
within the next 5 years relative to a baseline risk of developing breast can-
cer that varies with age. The relative risk is obtained by multiplying four
contributions to relative risk from categories A,B,C and D. In order to ob-
tain the actual 5-year risk of developing breast cancer, one multiplies this
relative risk with an age speci￿c baseline risk that increases from 0.134% at
age 30-34 to 1.157% at age 70-74 and then declines slightly to 1.006% at age
80-84/
The past history of cancer screening results is clearly endogenous. For
that reason we use an abridged version of the Gail index that measures the
cancer risk of a woman conditional on those risk factors that do not depend
on screening itself. This is the appropriate measure of risk if the screening
decision is measured using the answer to "have you ever been screened for
breast cancer". The variables required to construct the abridged Gail index
are parity, age at ￿rst birth, age at menarche and the number of direct rela-
tive that have developed breast cancer. We use these variables to generate
the Gail Index. In order to test for sensitivity to not using the history of
screening results, we repeat our analysis for women both across the entire
age range and for women aged 30-60 only. Since this latter group has re-
ceived substantially fewer screens, the likelihood of having a positive screen
is reduced and the abridged Gail Index provides a better proxy for breast
cancer risk. All our results are consistently found in the sample consisting
of younger women only.4
3.1.2 The National Health and Interview Survey
The NHIS is an annual household survey of the civilian, non-institutionalized
population of the US. The NHIS records demographic and socioeconomic
data as well as data on health behaviors, health status, and access to health
4A more complete analysis that incorporates the past screening history requires a
dynamic model of screening that is beyond the current scope of the analysis.
12care. In selected years additional modules are administered as part of the
NHIS. The 2000 and 2005 Surveys include a cancer control module.
In both survey years about 40,000 families with a total of 100,000 fam-
ily members were interviewed. In each household one adult (the "sample
adult") and one child (the ￿ sample child￿ ) are asked a more detailed set of
questions. In 2000 (2005) there were 32,374 (31,428) Sample Adults. We are
limiting ourselves to non-Hispanic sample adult females. Only women aged
30 and older were asked questions relating to breast cancer screening. This
leaves us with 11,764 (11,726) women aged 30-85 in 2000 (2005). Drop-
ping individuals with invalid answers about education, whether they ever
had cancer, and on whether they have had a mammogram removes 75, 6,
and 271 (2005: 125/13/871) observations respectively. A further 335 (369)
women report having had breast cancer and are likewise dropped. In order
to construct the Gail Index we require the age of onset of menstruation,
information on whether a woman has ever given a live birth and at what
age, and also the number of direct family members (parents, siblings, and
children) who have ever developed breast cancer. Insu¢ cient or incoherent
responses for these variables removes another 698 (680) individuals. We thus
retain 10,379 (9,668) women in the appropriate age range.
For the screening decision, our dependent variables are an indicator
varariable describing whether the woman had ever undergone a mammo-
gram and as an alternative independent variable the number of mammo-
grams the woman has received during the last 6 years. This variable allows
us to examine how the intensity of cancer screening varies across individuals.
For subjective risk assessments, we have categorical variables describing the
subjective risk of individuals. The content of these variables di⁄ers between
2000 and 2005. In 2000, we have a categorical variable (low, medium, high)
describing the subjective overall cancer risk, and in 2005 we have a similar
variable describing the subjective breast cancer risk.
We use as additional controls such as education, a categorical variable on
family income (relative to the poverty line), the size of the MSA the woman
resides in, and various variables describing health care coverage (medicare,
private, etc...). Finally, we are also using a variable from the 2005 NHIS
13that indicates whether a woman has been counselled by her physician to
receive a mammogram. We use this variable both as a dependent variable
and as a control.5
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
[Table 2]
The distribution of socioeconomic variables is typical for the population of
women aged 30-85. The average woman has more than a high school degree
and the average years of schooling completed increases between 2000 and
2005, re￿ ecting the higher rates of education among women born in later
cohorts. Less than 10% of women in this sample lack health care coverage
of any kind. This is partially because a sizeable fraction of women is older
than 65 and consequently covered by Medicare. In 2005, about half of all
women reported that they were recommended by a medical professional to
be screened for breast cancer.
Screening rates are high and increased slightly between 2000 and 2005.
The average Gail Index in the population is slightly greater than 1. It
increases between 2000 and 2005. This is driven by the observed decline
in age at menarche, the increase in the number of individuals with direct
family members that had breast cancer and the increase in age at ￿rst birth.
There is quite a bit of variation in the Gail Index in the population. The
standard deviation is about 0.8 in both years.
The subjective risk assessment variable di⁄ers between 2000 and 2005.
In 2000 respondents were asked whether their risk of developing cancer over-
all was low, medium or high, whereas in 2005 they were asked whether the
were less likely, about as likely or more likely than the average woman to de-
velop breast cancer speci￿cally. In 2005, about 12% of women overall report
that they perceive themselves to be more likely to develop breast cancer,
whereas about 35% believe themselves to be less likely to develop breast
cancer.
5In 2000 this variable was unfortunately only administered to those women who have
not been screened previously.
143.2 Reduced Form Speci￿cation
For the remainder of Section 3, we examine how cancer risk correlates with
a variety of outcomes. The most important outcomes we consider are the
subjective breast cancer risk assessments elicited from respondents to the
NHIS and information on the breast cancer screening behavior of women.
We also consider information on the screening recommendations made to
women by medical professionals and information on screening and subjective
risk related to other cancers. Most of the outcome variables we consider are
either binomial or multinomial categorical variables.
We therefore consider reduced form speci￿cations that account for the
categorical nature of the variables. These speci￿cations are usually based
around an index formulation, where the index is of the following form:
Indi = ￿0
xx + ￿G ￿ G + ￿s ￿ S + ￿G￿S ￿ S ￿ G + "i (3)
Here the variable S measures education and the variable G represents the
Gail index. The residual "i is assumed to be normal. We include a vector of
controls x, which are occasionally themselves interacted with the Gail index.
Generally we control for age using a full set of age dummies. We have
also examined whether all our results are robust to limiting the analysis
to women younger than age 60. Our speci￿cations also typically control
for income using the categorical income variables available in the data.6
We examine all our results for robustness to relaxing the linear schooling
e⁄ects to allow for non-linear speci￿cations of the education main e⁄ects as
well as for dropping the income measures. In the tables we report various
results from additional robustness checks. Among these are speci￿cations
that control for various measures of health care coverage. Unless we found
deviations from our main ￿ndings, we do not discuss the results from the
various robustness checks in the text.
6The income variable is a categorical variable that reports family income as a multiple
of the poverty line. The highest category represents incomes 5 times above the poverty
line. There is a sizable number of invalid answers for this question and we include a
dummy for missing answers.
15The index then determines the observed variable ￿i. Depending on the
variable of interest, ￿i will either be a multinomial ordered categorical vari-
able (for the subjective risk assessments) or a binomial categorical variable
(for the main screening speci￿cation and when we consider whether a doctor
recommended screening). We also report estimates from a screening model
where the dependent variable is the number of screens a woman underwent
during the last 6 years. In that case, ￿i will be a left censored random
variable with ￿i = Indi ￿ 1(Indi ￿ 0).
3.3 Subjective Risk Assessments and Education
The ￿rst empirical question we consider is whether educated women are
more likely than less educated women to report themselves to face a high
risk of developing breast cancer when they indeed face a high objective risk
of developing breast cancer risk. For this purpose, we estimate ordered
probit models based on speci￿cation (3) using the 2000 and 2005 subjective
cancer risk assessments.
If women with higher education do more accurately predict their in-
dividual cancer risk, then objective risk factors (as measured by the Gail
Index) should be more strongly correlated with subjective risk assessments
among educated women. The results of estimating ordered probits for the
risk assessment con￿rm this hypothesis for both the 2000 and 2005 data.
[Table 3]
We are interested in the interaction between schooling and Gail Index. The
positive interaction reported for 2000 and 2005 (col. 1 and 4) con￿rms that
self-reports of subjective cancer risk correlate more strongly with objective
risk among educated women.
In 2000, the subjective cancer risk question referred to the risk of cancer
generally and in 2005 to breast cancer speci￿cally. We therefore expect the
link between the Gail index to be stronger in 2005 than in 2000; we ￿nd
16that the main e⁄ects and the interactions with education are stronger in
2005 than in 2000. We will estimate the structural information model in
Section 4 and 5 using the questions from 2005 only.
The interaction of education with the Gail model survives including in-
come measures and interacting these with the Gail index. The interaction
of the income variable with the Gail index is not signi￿cant (individual or
jointly) in 2000 and close to marginally signi￿cant (with p-values around
0.11) in 2005. The sign of these Income ￿ Gail interactions is also positive
and thus indicates that those with higher incomes are more sensitive in their
risk assessments to the presence of risk factors. We discuss the Income ￿
Gail interactions in more detail below.
Family risk plays an important role in driving the association between
the Gail index and subjective risk. Once we include family risk dummies
(col. 3 and 6) and interact family risk with schooling, then the main e⁄ects
of the Gail index and the interactions of the Gail with schooling vanish.
Family risk seems to be more salient than other risk factors for determining
subjective risk.
Overall, we ￿nd that indeed the educated respond more to the presence of
risk factors than the less educated when answering questions about personal
breast cancer risk. Much of this is driven by family risk, but it indicates
that indeed the more educated have an advantage in processing risk relevant
information.
3.4 Cancer Screening and Education
We next show that the educated also tend to respond more to risk factors
when they make cancer screening decisions. We estimate speci￿cation (3) for
a Probit model where the dependent variable ￿ indicates whether a woman
has ever received a mammogram. A positive estimate of ￿G￿S indicates
that educated women are relatively more likely to receive screens if they
face objective cancer risks compared to less educated women.
As an alternative dependent variables we also consider the number of
screens a woman has received during the last 6 years. Thus, we also estimate
17a Tobit on speci￿cation (3) where the dependent variable ￿6 represents the
number of mammograms during the last 6 years.
Table 4 Panel 1 presents the parameter estimates for both speci￿cations
obtained on the 2000 data. In columns 1 and 6 (our baseline) the control set
includes a set of dummies for the income variable. The baseline speci￿cation
also includes a full set of dummies for age and race. Table 4, panel 2 reports
the analogous results for the 2005 data and in table 5, panels 1 and 2 we
show the marginal e⁄ects of the Probit speci￿cation to provide an indication
of the magnitude of these e⁄ects.
[Tables 4 and 5]
We ￿nd (and this ￿nding is robust across speci￿cations), that more edu-
cated individuals respond more to risk factors than do less educated individ-
uals. The e⁄ect on the propensity to screen (the marginal e⁄ect) reported
in table 5, column 1 gives an indication of the size of the e⁄ect. In 2000, an
increase in the Gail Index by one unit (doubling the relative risk of breast
cancer) raises the probability of screening by about 3 percentage points more
among college educated women than among women with only a high school
degree. Given the overall rate of screening in the population of about 75%,
this represents a sizeable additional responsiveness. The ￿ndings are similar
when we consider the intensity of screening using the Tobit speci￿cation.
Interestingly, income and the Gail index also interact in the screening
decision (cols 4 and 9). There are various interpretations for this fact. One
possibility is that demand factors of the type discussed in Section 2 gen-
erate a higher response of screening to risk factors among those with high
incomes. Another interpretation of this interaction is that income/earnings
and education are both measures of human capital. This explanation has the
virtue of being consistent with the ￿nding reported in table 3 that subjec-
tive income and the Gail model do interact in the subjective risk assessment
questions.
183.5 Better Doctors?
The results reported in tables 2 to 5 show that educated women respond
more strongly to the presence of objective risk factors when they report their
subjective risk assessments and also when they decide on screening. This
positive interaction both in the subjective risk data as well as in the screen-
ing decision is suggestive that the educated are indeed better at processing
health information. An alternative explanation for this fact is however that
the educated or those with more income might simply have access to better
doctors who help them make this decision.
In table 6 we present 3 di⁄erent ways of testing for this hypothesis using
a variable from the 2005 NHIS that reports whether a doctor has recom-
mended a mammogram within the last 12 months. In columns 1 and 3 we
show that women who were recommended to receive a mammogram were
indeed more likely to undergo a screen and they also perceived themselves to
be at higher risk. However, there is no evidence (column 2) that the doctor
recommendations interacted with either education or with the Gail index
or with the triple-interaction in generating concerns about cancer screen-
ing. Furthermore, we can not ￿nd a statistically perceptible change in the
Schooling ￿ Gail interaction when we control for the doctor recommendation
alone or including its interactions with the Gail and with education. Our
results are similar for the screening decision. If anything both the interac-
tion between the Gail and education becomes slightly stronger both in the
subjective assessments and in the screening decision. These results indicate
that doctors recommendation did not disproportionately induce educated,
high risk women to receive screens.
In columns 5 and 6 we directly consider the question whether schooling
and the Gail index interacted in determining whether a doctor recommended
screening. There is no evidence that doctors responded more to the presence
of risk factors when advising patients with high rather than low education
levels. Overall, we do not ￿nd evidence that educated women visit doctors
that are more sensitive to risk factors when recommending screening.
19[Table 6]
3.6 Colorectal and Cervical Cancer Screening
Finally, we consider screening behavior related to colorectal and cervical
cancer. We do not have access to a risk model comparable to the Gail
model for these cancers and therefore limit ourselves to considering how
screening behavior and subjective risk assessments for these cancers vary
with the occurrence of these cancers in the family. We will refer to family
risk below as a variable that indicates whether a cancer of the relevant type
has been observed among direct relatives of the respond.
Table 7 summarizes how family risk interacts with education in both the
screening decisions and subjective risk assessments for Breast Cancer, Col-
orectal Cancer and Cervical cancer. Each column corresponds to a di⁄erent
screening decision or subjective risk assessment. Reported are only the in-
teractions with family risk. Each speci￿cation includes both the family risk
for the cancer in question as well as the family risk for the cancers that are
not relevant for the test or the subjective risk assessment. The estimnates
are obtained by estimating speci￿cation (3) with full sets of dummies for
age, education, ethnicity, and income.
[Table 7]
In columns (1)-(4) we examine the decision to screen for colorectal, cer-
vical and breast cancer. We pool the data across both 2000 and 2005 and
fully interact all controls with year dummies. Colonoscopies and Home
Blood Stool tests screen colorectal cancer and pap smears screen for cervi-
cal cancer. If the educated are more responsive to the presence of speci￿c
cancer risk, then we expect the reported interaction on family breast can-
cer risk in column (1), family colon cancer risk in columns (2) and (3) and
family cervical cancer risk in column 4 to be positive. We do not expect
interactions of either sign with any of the cancers that are not subject of
the screen or subjective risk question.
20In addition to the subjective risk question about Breast Cancer, the
NHIS 2005 also includes a similar question for colorectal cancer. We there-
fore estimate ordered probits with interactions between various cancer types
in the family and education to examine whether again the subjective risk
assessments of educated individuals are more responsive to the presence of
risk factors than are those of the less educated. We report these estimates
in columns (5) and (6).
The only statistically or economically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in table 7
are those on the speci￿c cancers in question. The coe¢ cients on colorectal
family risk for the blood stool test is economically irrelevant. Home blood
stool tests are known to be of low predictive power, potentially explaining
that we ￿nd little systematic behavior with respect to these. The coe¢ cients
on the pap smear test is statistically not signi￿cant, the point estimate is
however sizeable and of the expected sign. For subjective risk we observe
that the educated respond more than the less educated to the presence of
breast cancer risk among direct relatives when they judge their own breast
cancer risk and the same is true for colorectal cancer risk. They don￿ t
generally seem more responsive to the presence of cancer among other family
members.
Overall, the results reported in table 7 are broadly consistent with the
hypothesis that the educated both respond more to the presence of risk
factors when they decide to be screened for cancer as well as when they
report their subjective risk of developing cancer.
3.7 Discussion of Reduced Form Results
Overall the detailed examination of the data revealed the robust result in-
creases the responsiveness to the presence of cancer risk factors both in
subjective risk assessments and in the cancer screening decisions. Our ev-
idence resembles the type of evidence provided by Kenkel (1991a, 1991b)
in that we examine both survey responses related to health knowledge and
observational data from behaviors in reduced form. Because we examine a
di⁄erent type of health behavior and health risk, they provide additional
21support for the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis.
What we can not do is determine the extent to which information rather
than demand e⁄ects drive the interaction of education with risk factors using
only the screening decision. For that purpose one does need to combine
information about subjective risk assessments of individuals with observed
screening decisions. This requires an explicit model of health information.
4 A model of objective breast cancer risks, sub-
jective risk assessments and screening decisions
The NHIS contains data on the subjective risk of developing breast cancer,
on objective risk factors and on the decision to screen. The challenge we face
is to write down an explicit, estimable model that links these components. In
particular, we need to model how agents form subjective risk judgements and
how the breast cancer screening decision is related to these subjective risk
judgements. Clearly, this model does not realistically describe the mental
processes that take place when individuals assess risks, but it is intended
to describe the joint distribution of subjective and objective risks as well as
the screening decision in a transparent manner.
4.1 The information model
According to the medical literature, the objective risk factors facing an in-
dividual can be summarized by an Index Gi called the Gail Index. For our
purposes we can think of the Gail Index as the 5 year probability of devel-
oping breast cancer.7 We construct the Gi for each individual in the data
using the information in the NHIS.
Our risk model centers around a latent variable ti describing a womans
cancer status. If ti < 0; then the woman will develop breast cancer within
the next 5 years.
7The Gail Index is actually a measure of the relative risk of breast cancer compared to
women of the same age. We translate this relative risk into actual probabilities using the
base-line probability of developing breast cancer.
22Next we associate the Gail Index Gi with a variable gi that lives in the
same space as the latent risk variable ti. We relate the Gi and gi to ti using
assumption A1:
Assumption A1 The latent variable ti is distributed according to ti =
gi + "t with "t ￿ N(0;1):
Because Gi represents the probability of developing breast cancer we
have P(t < 0jgi) = ￿(￿gi) = Gi where ￿(￿) is the normal cdf. This de￿nes
a value gi associated with each Gi:8
Assumption A2 Individuals learn about their risk by drawing a signal





and "s ? "t:





; the distribution of the
signal conditional on the Gail index. The Gail index is a discrete random
variable that is observed in the data and de￿nes a marginal distribution
P(g). This therefore delivers the joint distribution F (s;g) = ￿gP (g) ￿






Next, we need to describe how signals s are related to the subjective
risk assessments available in the data. Our information about subjective
risks comes in the form of answers to: "Do you believe that you are of low,
medium, high risk of developing breast cancer?". Assumption A.3 provides
the link between the answer to this question and the signal s.
Assumption A3 There are two cuto⁄s (sH;sL) such that if s > sL then
the woman declares herself to be of low risk and if s < sH then she will say
that she is of high risk. In between, she calls herself of medium risk.
To estimate the variance of the signal ￿2
s we will use the joint distribu-
tion of the answers to the subjective risk questions with the objective risks
faced by individuals. Conditional on the Gail index, 3 parameters in the






and represent the parameters of the model that
need to be estimated using the observed fractions of individuals who declare
themselves to be of low or high risk conditional on the Gail Index. Denote
8Setting the variance of the residual "y to unity represents a normalization as long as
the mapping from Gi to gi is unrestricted.
23these fractions by
n
b PL;g; b PH;g
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: Then, the information model implies that











These moment conditions relate the Gail index to the subjective risk
factors and allow us to estimate the parameters of the information model.
Note that we assume that individuals do know the average breast cancer
risk conditional on age. Within age, we construct the moments (4) in the
manner described above.
4.2 The decision model
Screening lowers the mortality risk associated with breast cancer through
early diagnosis. Let d￿ represents the mortality reduction due to early di-
agnosis that can be achieved by screening. Let ci = c + "c represent the
costs of screening which depends on a common component c and an individ-
ual component "c: This cost includes both ￿nancial costs and psychic costs
associated with the screening procedure.
A woman with signal si therefore decides to screen (￿ = 1) i⁄:
V SL ￿ d￿ ￿ P(ti < 0jsi) > c + "c (5)




￿c ￿ P(ti < 0jsi) ￿ c
￿c
￿
will decide to screen where V = V SL￿d￿:
Once we estimated the parameters of the information model we can
construct the joint distributions of (s;g;t) and therefore also P (t < 0js):9
We can also use estimate of F (s;G) and the estimated cuto⁄s (sL;sH) to
9Assumption A.1 implies that P(t < 0jgi) = ￿(￿gi) and using P(g) we get the prior
distribution P (t < 0) = ￿g￿(￿gi)P (gi): The posterior distribution after receiving the
individual signal s is P (t < 0js) = ￿g￿(￿gi) ￿ P (gjs): Based on the estimated ￿
2
s from
the information model we can construct F (s;g) and can therefore also obtain P(gjs) =
F(sjg)￿P(g)
f(s) : Therefore, for each signal we can generate P (t < 0js) after estimating the
information model.
24determine the fraction of women screening for breast cancer conditional on
G and conditional on reporting herself to be of low risk as:












Similar moments are obtained for medium and high subjective risk and













￿s. These are su¢ cient to generate the screening
demands conditional on the subjective and objective risks.
5 Estimating the Structural Model
5.1 The Information model
As described above, the parameters of the information model can be esti-
mated using the moment conditions in equation (4). To estimate the infor-
mation parameters we allow for separate cuto⁄s (sL;sH) by education and
5-year age-group. We restrict ￿s to be constant across age, but estimate ￿s
separately for each of the three education levels (￿ 12;14;￿ 16):
Table 8.shows our estimates of ￿s for each education level. In panel A
we show the results for the full risk model. The reduced form results in
tables 3 however suggested that the presence of cancer in the family is more
salient than the other risk factors entering the Gail index. We therefore
also estimated the information by constructing the Gail index using only
the information on the family risk. The results when estimating this model
are presented in panel B. In our discussion we will largely limit ourselves to
the full risk model.
We boot-strap the measures of dispersion.10 For the full risk model and
some of the boot-strapped samples, the relation between the Gail and the
10It takes signi￿cantly longer to estimate the full risk model rather than the model using
family risk only. For this reason we currently bootstrap the full risk model 60 times and
the family risk model 500 times.
25subjective risk assessment is negative. For these samples, the estimates of
￿s go to in￿nity. We therefore report three measures of dispersion. First,
we report the standard deviation of b ￿s and the 90% con￿dence intervals
conditional on having a ￿nite b ￿s and then we show the number of samples
(out of 60) for which b ￿s ! 1:
[Table 8]
These estimates con￿rm the ￿nding from the multinomial Probit model
estimated in Section 2 that less educated women are less informed about
the risks they face. This is true if we compare the signal noise ￿s of women
with 12 years of education with that of women with more education, but
also if we compare the signal noise of women with 13-15 years of completed
schooling relative to that of women with 16 or more years of education.
Overall, we ￿nd a much stronger relation between the true risk and the
individual subjective risk among educated than less educated women.
5.2 The Decision Model.
The estimated information model describes how the private signal s and
the objective Gail are linked and consequently describes how the subjective
morality risk is distributed conditional on the Gail signal and the reported
subjective risk assessment. Based on this distribution we can estimate the
parameters of the decision model. In particular, we can numerically generate
the predicted probability of screening conditional on the information model
and the parameters of the decision model. The information model together
with the decision model therefore generates the following moments for each
point of the support of the Gail distribution:
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dF (sjg;sH < s < sL) (7)
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26The empirical counterparts to these moments are the observed fractions of
individuals that are screened for breast cancer conditional on their objective
cancer risk and their subjectively reported cancer risk.






separately for each edu-
cation level using minimum distance and the moments in equation (7): In





as fourth-order polynomials in age and consequently need to esti-
mate a total of 8 parameters for each education group. The Gail index is a
discrete random variable with 33 support points and we have 11 5-year age
groups for the age-range (30-85). Individuals can give 3 di⁄erent possible
responses to the subjective risk question. We thus have potentially a total
of 33*11*3=1,089 moments with which to estimate 8 parameters for each
education group. However, some points in the Gail support are not popu-
lated in the data and we typically estimate the 8 parameters using between
200 and 400 moments.







identi￿ed up to scale. We estimate these parameters for each education level








The parameters (V;c) are identi￿ed using both the overall propensity to
screen and how the propensity to screen varies with the subjective risk of
cancer. The variation in the subjective risk of cancer is driven by both
cancer risk factors and by the age-risk associated with cancer. Thus, the
parameter c can be loosely said to ￿t the propensity to screen overall, while
the parameter V can be said to ￿t the response to variation in risk. Together,
they capture how screening demands vary with subjective risk across the
population.
The parameters (V;c) are di¢ cult to interpret since they capture varia-
tion in the VSL across age, the costs over age as well as the heterogeneity
27in costs. All of these terms are di¢ cult to measure in the data and for
most we only have very little guidance from theory. We therefore refrain
from interpreting these parameters directly. What is important for us here
is that they capture the di⁄erences in screening propensities conditional on
the Gail index and the subjective risk assessments. We consider how well
the model ￿ts these patterns next.
5.2.1 Model Fit
Rather than trying to interpret the demand parameters directly, we consider
whether the parsimonious structure we have estimated ￿ts observed screen-
ing patterns. As described above, we ￿t about 200-400 moments for each
education level using a total of 8 parameters.
Figure 1 shows the predicted and observed fraction screened for all mo-
ments for which we have at least 5 observations. As expected, the predicted
and the observed fraction screened are placed around the 45 degree line.
There is substantial dispersion around the 45 degree line, suggesting that
the current model does not capture all the relevant determinants of the
screening decision. There is however little evidence in this graph that we
systematically over- or underpredict for any particular range of the observed
screening shares.
In part, this is certainly driven by the fact that the age-pro￿le is ￿t quite
well and that age has a large in￿ uence on screening. Figure 2 shows how
the predicted and observed shares screening shares vary with age. These
two lines are fairly close. Only at age 75 do we observe a sizeable di⁄erence
between the predicted and the observed shares screening.
There are however notable di⁄erences between predicted and observed
screening rates. Table 10 shows how the di⁄erence between predicted and
observed screening rates by subjective screening risk and education.
[Table 10]
For individuals who judge themselves to be of low subjective breast cancer
risk, we observe for all education levels that we underestimate the shares of
28individual screening. And, for medium risk we observe that we overpredict
the screening rates for all 3 groups. It is not quite clear what generates this
pattern.
In the discussion of the multinomial Probit results, we showed that
whether a women had cancer in the family played a very large role in de-
termining subjective risk assessments. As shown in columns (3) and (6),
controlling for main e⁄ects and education interactions of the presence of
breast cancer seems to largely eliminate the role of the Gail Index in sub-
jective beliefs. Conditional on family risk, the information contained in the
other risk factors and in the functional form of the Gail Index seems to be
of little consequence in forming subjective risk judgements. The presence of
breast cancer when compared to the age at menarche, parity or the age at
￿rst birth is simply much a more salient risk factor.
The salience of family risk has consequence for the ￿t of the model that
is estimated using the full risk model. This "full-risk:" model tends to
over underestimate the share of women who are screened conditional on the
presence of breast cancer in the family. Figure 3 shows that we substantially
underpredict the probability to screen for cancer for individuals with 1 or
more direct family members with cancer. For this reason we have also
reestimated the information model using only the family risk and reported
the estimated ￿s in table 8B. Moving to the "family risk" model leads to a
substantial improvement of the estimation procedure in the sense that the
model converges for all boot-strapped samples drawn and indeed generally
converges more rapidly to the parameter estimates. Qualitatively we ￿nd
that the signal variance is lower for the family risk model and we also ￿nd
that the di⁄erence in signal noise across education is less pronounced than for
the full risk model. Most importantly however, we ￿nd again that educated
women draw more precise signals compared to less educated women. 11
11We also reestimated the demand parameters using the family risk variables only. These
are very similar to the parameters reported for the full risk. We ￿nd little value in showing
these parameters in a separate table, but they are of course available upon request.
295.3 Results
In the previous Section we presented estimates of the information and the
demand parameters of our model. In this Section we use these estimates
to generate counterfactual behaviors that allows us to judge whether the
di⁄erences in the information across education levels are quantitatively im-
portant. For both the full-risk and the family risk model, we ￿nd ￿nd that
di⁄erences in the information model can almost entirely account for the dif-
ferences in the responsiveness to risk observed in the data. We also ￿nd that
the overall gradient in screening across education is mainly due to di⁄erences
in the demand parameters.
In table 11 we show how responsive individuals of di⁄erent education
levels are to variation in objective medical risk under di⁄erent counterfac-
tual assumptions about the model parameters. To generate these results we
maintained the distribution over the Gail-Index and age within each edu-
cation group and then generated screening rates using the information and
screening model from Section 4 for di⁄erent values of the parameter vector
(￿s;V;c): Using this data, we then estimate for each education group a Pro-
bit relating the screening decisions to a full-set of age-dummies as well as
the Gail Index.
[Table 11]
In table 12 we show the analogous results for the family risk model. Here
we included dummies for the number of direct relatives with breast cancer.
Omitted is the dummy for "no family member" and included is a dummy
both for "one family member with breast cancer" and "more than one family
member with breast cancer". We again show the coe¢ cient estimates for
the e⁄ect of these dummies in a probit.
[Table 12]
In both tables, the baseline-estimates (speci￿cation (1)) are obtained by
using the parameter estimates from the full risk model in Tables 8 and 9
30that apply to each education group. The reported coe¢ cients con￿rm the
reduced form result that the less educated respond less to risk factors than
the highly educated.
We next investigate whether the di⁄erences in the estimated information
or demand parameters generate the di⁄erence in the response to risk factors
across education. For this purpose we we use counterfactual parameter val-
ues. In speci￿cation (2), we apply the ￿s estimated from the education = 16
to all education classes but maintain the demand parameters as estimated
separately for each education class. For both the full risk and the family
risk model, we ￿nd that this leads the less educated to respond substantially
more to risk. We then consider how screening behavior changes if we main-
tain the estimated information parameters, but endow the less educated
with the demand parameters of the most educated. In speci￿cation (3) we
hold the information quality constant at the base-line values and apply the
demand parameters of education levels 16 to all. Clearly, di⁄erences in the
demand parameters play only a small role in generating di⁄erences in the
responsiveness to risk factors.12
The question then arises whether the observed di⁄erences in the quality
of information across education classes might be responsible for the overall
observed gradient in the screening rates across education categories. Inter-
estingly, this is not the case. Table 13 shows how average screening rates
vary across counterfactual states for the full risk model and Table 14 for
the family risk model. In column 1 we see the screening rates implies by
the estimated parameters. We observe a substantial gradient in screening
rates with education. Next we go from this base-line to the counterfactual
state when the quality of information among all individuals is equal to the
value estimated for those with 16 or more years of education. In this coun-
terfactual state, the di⁄erence in screening rates between those with 12 or
less years of education and those with 16 or more years of education actu-
12Speci￿cation (4) than shows the results when both the demand and information para-
meters estimated using those with more than a college degree are applied to all education
classes. By construction the response to risk is similar to the right-most entry in speci￿-
cation (1) for all education levels.
31ally widens substantially. The increase in the quality of information for the
less educated widens the posterior variance of the expected probability of
developing cancer. This has the e⁄ect of lowering the expected probability
of cancer among some women with low risk factors and these women then
refrain from screening. Speci￿cation (3) then shows that screening rates
overall are highly responsive to changes in the demand parameters. Apply-
ing the demand parameters of those with 16 years of education to the entire
sample results (while maintaining the information parameters) reverses the
screening gradient in education.
[Table 13] [Table 14]
Overall, we ￿nd that the di⁄erences in quality of information across edu-
cation generate the observed di⁄erences in in how much women respond in
their screening decision to the presence of risk factors. The overall screening
gradient however seems to be generated by di⁄erences in the demand for
health across education classes.
6 Discussion
In our analysis we have modeled the e⁄ect of education on health information
as reducing the noise with which people observe health-relevant information.
In our data (and indeed, most health data) however, the information which is
known to the econometrician is typically a subset of what the decision maker
knows; indeed the data is often self-reported and therefore all individual in-
formation observed by the econometrician is also available to the individual.
Taken literally then, our model would predict no information-side driven
interactions between education and responses to self-reported risk factors.
That is, how can smaller responses to the presence of risk-factors which the
subject knows about be due to "information side" di⁄erences by education?
The answer lies in the interpretation of the information-side e⁄ects we
estimate; intuitively, we model education not necessarily as improving a
person￿ s knowledge of their health characteristics, but improving their un-
32derstanding of how these characteristics in￿ uence their risk of breast cancer.
People may be aware of what risk-factors they have, but unaware of how
these risk factors a⁄ect the marginal returns to di⁄erent types of preventa-
tive care..That is, a person￿ s noisy signal of their risk-factors in our model
is a proxy for di⁄erential uncertainty about the risk factors associated with
breast cancer, and or what they can do to reduce their risks. This is consis-
tent with Kenkel￿ s ￿nding that more educated individuals were more aware
of the speci￿c heath risks associated with smoking, drinking, and less exer-
cise (Kenkel 1991a, 1991b).
Another even greater form of uncertainty may be that people also may
have di⁄erent beliefs about the usefulness of medical science or the relative
importance of medical care. Several studies have suggested that di⁄eren-
tial beliefs and faith in the medical system may explain important health
disparities, for example several studies have found lower levels of drug ad-
herence among African Americans controlling for a wide set of demographics
(Shenolikar et al. 2006).
Suggestive that both of these types of model-uncertainty may be impor-
tant in breast-cancer screening, we ￿nd two interesting patterns in a recent
survey conducted by the San Francisco Mammography Registry (Table 13).
[Table 15]
First, we ￿nd that education is highly correlated with a woman￿ s score
on a test of accurate knowledge about risk-factors for breast cancer (as iden-
ti￿ed but those risk-factors included in the Gail model). Second, we ￿nd
that controlling for other demographic factors, education is highly predic-
tive of a woman￿ s likelihood of agreeing with statements that downplay the
relative e¢ cacy of preventative medical care, statement such as: "if a person
prays about it, God will protect her from getting cancer", and "if a lump
in a woman￿ s breast is not bothersome, there is no need to consult a doc-
tor". This suggests that the noisy-information model we propose is at least
partially a proxy for health related model-uncertainty, both on the level of
concrete knowledge of risk-factors, and on more meta-cognitive beliefs about
33the relative e¢ cacy of medical-science and health care.
7 Conclusion
We have above discussed evidence on allocative e¢ ciency from breast cancer
screening. First, we showed that educated individuals are more responsive
to the presence of risk factors in both the screening decision and in their
judgements about the subjective risk they are facing. These results in them-
selves are highly suggestive that more educated individuals process health
information more e¢ ciently and incorporate this information more readily
into their health investment decisions.
We then illustrated the identi￿cation problems that make it impossible
to separately identify the e⁄ect of education due to allocative e¢ ciency from
di⁄erences in the demand for health by education level using only observa-
tional data. To resolve this identi￿cation problem, we estimate a structural
model of information that allows to generate a joint distribution of subjective
risk and objective risk factors from a set of questions about the subjective
risk of agents that is contained in the NHIS data. We estimate this informa-
tion model separately by education level and then use the obtained estimates
to estimate the demand parameters governing the screening decision.
Our results are consistent with the reduced from model in that we ￿nd
that educated individuals are much better informed about the risks they
face and are furthermore more responsive to the risks they face when mak-
ing screening decisions. Our model treats all risk factors symmetrically and
while this is an attractive a priori feature of the model, it does seem to fail
empirically. The presence of cancer in the family is a risk that seems sub-
stantially more salient in the subjective risk assessments of individuals than
other risk factors. We do not allow for this feature of the data in our current
model and thus underestimate the propensity to screen for individuals with
one or more direct relatives with breast cancer. Future work will estimate
the same risk model, focusing only on family risk.
Our structural model allows us to examine the counterfactual screening
rates obtained if all education groups had the same signal precision as do the
34college educated or if they all had the same demand parameters. Our ￿rst
set of ￿ndings suggests that di⁄erences in information processing indeed are
quantitatively very important for understanding why the more educated are
more responsive to the presence of risk factors in screening.
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At least one biopsy, no atypical hyperplasia 0.93
Atypical hyperplasia in at least one biopsy 1.82
C. # of breast biopsies
D. Atypical hyperplasia
To compute overall relative risk multiply four component relative risk from categories A,B,C,D
Table 1 Relative risks from the Gail model. Reproduced from Gail et al. (1999)
 Risk factor category
A. Age at menarche, 
years
B. Age at first live birth, 
yearsTable 2 Summary Statistics  
  NHIS 2000  NHIS 2005 
Screening Variables     
Ever Had?  0.727  0.755 




Demographic Variables     
White 0.82  0.82 





Socio-Economic Variables     





    
 non-MSA  22.90% 
 <250K  9.34% 
 250-500K  12.02% 
 500K-1M  11.83% 
na 
 1-2.5M  23.65%   
 2.5-5M  12.11%   
 >5M  8.14%   
Family Income
1   




 %  >5  20.67%  21.62% 
 not  available  22.20%  20.77% 
Health Care Coverage     
Not Covered  9.98%  8.99% 
Breast Cancer Risk






Parity>0 0.81  0.81 








# of direct female relatives 
with breast cancer 
  
0 90.11%  88.86% 
1 9.09%  10.16% 
>1 0.80%  0.98% 
Doctor recommended screening
3 na 53.41% 
Subjective Risk Assessment
4   
  Low   52.18%  Less likely  34.57% 
  Medium  29.49%  About as likely  48.09% 
 High  11.47%  More  likely  11.64% 
 na  6.86%  na  5.71% 
Observations 10,379  9,668 
1 Family Income is reported relative to poverty line with 13 categories between 0 and 5. For the summary statistics I assign the mid 
point to each interval. There is no separate distinction for family incomes above 5 times the poverty line. The percentages in this 
category as well as those with invalid responses are reported. The analysis uses the income variable as a categorical variable 
throughout, including invalid responses as a separate category. 
2 The Gail Index is a constructed variable using the age at menstruation, age, family cancer history variables, parity, and the age at 
first birth. 
3 (within last 12 months). In 2000 this question was only asked of women who were never screened. 
4 In 2000 the subjective risk assessment variable refers to asked whether general subjective risk of cancer was low, medium, or high. 
In 2005 the question referred specifically to Breast Cancer Specific Risk and asked about likelihood of developing breast cancer 
relative to average women.  
Table 3: Subjective Cancer Risk Assessment and Education 
 2000  2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.045 -0.044 -0.025 -0.055  -0.05  -0.02  Years of Schooling 
[0.009]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]* 
0.017 -0.057 0.004 -0.083 -0.113  0.02  Gail Index 
[0.085] [0.093] [0.097] [0.085] [0.089] [0.097] 
0.021 0.020 0.001 0.033 0.028 0.000  Years of Schooling x 
Gail  [0.006]** [0.007]**  [0.007]  [0.006]** [0.007]**  [0.007] 
 0.010    0.010   Income x Gail 
 [0.007]    [0.006]  
 0.058    0.102   High Income x Gail 
 [0.072]    [0.067]  
   -0.053    -0.523  Breast Cancer in 
Family     [0.240]    [0.253]* 
   0.066    0.117  Breast Cancer in 
Family X Education        [0.018]**        [0.019]** 
Observations 9,667  9,667 9,667 9,116 9,116 9,116 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Report estimates from ordered probit regressions on individual 
cancer risk assessment: low, medium, high. In 2000, the question about 
cancer risk referred to all cancers, whereas in 2005 the question 
referred to Breast Cancer specifically. All specifications control for 
ethnicity, age-dummies, ratio of income to poverty (dummies). The 
Family Risk variable in columns (3) and (6) is a dummy measuring 
whether a direct relative in the family has ever been diagnosed with 
breast cancer.      
  
Table 4 Panel 1: Breast Cancer Screening Behavior, Risk, and Education – 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Ever received a Mammogram?   # of Screens in last 6 years 
0.020      0.029  0.046  0.045    0.057  Years of 
Schooling  [0.011]       [0.012]*  [0.022]*  [0.022]*    [0.023]* 
-0.246 -0.056 -0.345 -0.389 -0.236 -0.510    -0.050 -0.822 -0.384  Gail Index  [0.108]*  [0.141] [0.123]**  [0.118]**  [0.114]* [0.202]*    [0.252] [0.222]** [0.208] 
0.027 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.065 0.061 0.056 0.055 0.053  School*Gail 
Index  [0.009]** [0.009]**  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009]** [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.017]** [0.016]** 
 -0.028        -0.060  -0.059     Gail Index ^2    [0.012]*       [0.021]**  [0.021]**    
   0.031  0.034       0.053    Income*Gail     [0.009]**  [0.009]**       [0.016]**   
   0.473  0.509       0.609    (Income>5)*Gail     [0.111]**  [0.110]**       [0.176]**   
     0.157       0.302  Medium subj. 
Cancer Risk       [0.036]**       [0.069]** 
     0.368       0.649  High subj. 
Cancer Risk        [0.053]**       [0.097]** 
Observations  10,379 10,379 10,379 10,379  9,667  10,234 10,234 10,234 10,234  9,557 
Standard errors in brackets.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Columns 1-5 report estimates of a 
probit specification with dependent variable: has a woman ever undergone a mammography. Cols 6-10 report 
estimates of tobit using the left-censored variable: #-mammaograms within last 6 year.     
Column 1,6: Baseline with dummies for income, age, ethnicity and race     
Column 2,7: + Education dummies, quadratic gail            
Column  3,8:  +  income*gail  interaction         
Column  4,9:  +  health  insurance         
Column 5,10: as in cols 1 and 5 with indicators for self assessed risk.   
Table 4 Panel 2: Breast Cancer Screening Behavior, Risk, and Education – 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Ever received a Mammogram?  # of Screens in last 6 years 
0.011       0.010  0.018        Years of Schooling 
[0.013]       [0.026]  [0.023]       
-0.139  0.038  -0.203 -0.290 -0.228  -0.119  -0.463  0.104  -0.550 -0.725 -0.476 -0.395 
Gail  Index  [0.134]  [0.175]  [0.144] [0.142]* [0.164] [0.146]  [0.203]* [0.257] [0.218]*  [0.217]*
* 
[0.204]* [0.214] 
0.027 0.022 0.007 0.010 0.007  0.023  0.066 0.054 0.049 0.052 0.044 0.052 
School*Gail Index  [0.010]*
* 












  -0.022        -0.065      
Gail Index ^2    [0.014]            [0.019]*
* 
    
   0.046  0.053  0.046      0.040  0.054  0.029   






    [0.016]*  [0.016]*
* 
[0.014]*  
   0.585  0.653  0.536      0.395  0.547  0.354   






    [0.168]*  [0.167]*
* 
[0.156]*  
     1.109        2.371   
Doctor  Recommend       [0.041]*
* 
      [0.060]*
* 
 
      -0.035        0.146  Medium subj. 
Cancer  Risk        [0.037]        [0.067]* 
      0.406        1.045  High subj. Cancer 
Risk         [0.062]*
* 
      [0.104]*
* 
Observations  9668 9667 9667 9667 8859 9116 9568 9568 9568 9568 8777 9041 
Standard errors in brackets.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Columns 1-5 report estimates of a 
probit specification with dependent variable: has a woman ever undergone a mammography. Cols 6-10 report 
estimates of tobit using the left-censored variable: #-mammaograms within last 6 year. 
Column 1,7: Baseline with dummies for income, age, ethnicity and race     
Column 2,8: + Education dummies, quadratic gail            
Column  3,9:  +  income*gail  interaction         
Column  4,10:  +  health  insurance          
Column 5,11: + doc recommendation 
Column 6,12: as in cols 1 and 7 with indicators for self assessed risk.             
Table 5 Panel 1: Breast Cancer Screening Behavior, Risk, and Education 
2000 - Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Ever? ever? ever? ever? ever? 
0.006       Years of 
Schooling  [0.003]      
-0.074 -0.017 -0.102 -0.115 -0.082  Gail Index  [0.032]* [0.042]  [0.036]**  [0.035]**  [0.036]* 
0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.008  School*     
Gail  Index  [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003]** 
 -0.008       Gail Index ^2   [0.004]*      
   0.009  0.010   Income*     
Gail     [0.003]**  [0.003]**  
   0.141  0.151   (Income>5)* 
Gail     [0.033]**  [0.032]**  
     0.045  Medium subj. 
Cancer  Risk       [0.010]** 
     0.098  High subj. 
Cancer Risk           [0.012]** 
Observations  10379 10379 10379 10379  9664 
Standard errors in brackets.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Reported 
are marginal effects for prbitspecifications in table 2.1 * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.         
Column 1: Baseline with dummies for income, age, ethnicity and race     
Column 2: + Education dummies, quadratic gail           
Column 3: + income*gail interaction          
Column 4: + health insurance 
Column 5: + risk assessments 
      
Table 5 Panel 2: Breast Cancer Screening Behavior, Risk, and Education 
2005 - Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Ever? 
0.003         Years of 
Schooling  [0.003]        
-0.038 0.010 -0.054 -0.076 -0.047 -0.032  Gail Index  [0.036]  [0.047] [0.038]  [0.037]* [0.034]  [0.039] 
0.007 0.006  0.002 0.003 0.001 0.006  School*Gail 
Index  [0.003]**  [0.003]* [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]* 
 -0.006       Gail^2   [0.004]      
    0.012 0.014 0.010   Income*Gail     [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]**   
    0.156 0.172 0.111   (Income>5)*Gail     [0.031]** [0.031]** [0.027]**   
     0.242   
Doctor recommend       [0.009]**   
      -0.010  Avg Subj. Risk        [0.010] 
      0.094  High Subj. Risk        [0.012]**
Observations  9668 9667  9667 9667 8859 9116 
Standard errors in brackets.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Reported 
are marginal effects for probit specifications in table 2.2 * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.         
Column 1: Baseline with dummies for income, age, ethnicity and race     
Column 2: + Education dummies, quadratic gail           
Column 3: + income*gail interaction          
Column 4: + health insurance 
Column 5: + risk assessmen  
Table 6: Doctor Screening Recommendations 
  Subj Risk  Screening  Doctor Recommendation
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
-0.104 -0.161      0.056 -0.046  Gail Index 
[0.090] [0.126]      [0.023]*  [0.099] 
0.035 0.04 0.029  0.031    0.008  Education X Gail 
[0.007]** [0.010]** [0.012]*  [0.015]*    [0.007] 
0.097 0.086 1.108 1.136      Doctor recommended 
Mammogram  [0.027]** [0.252] [0.041]**  [0.391]**     
 0.093  -0.095     Doc Rec X Gail 
 [0.179]  [0.307]    
 0.002  0.015     Doc Rec X Education 
 [0.019]  [0.029]    
 -0.008  -0.011     Doc Rec X Gail X Educ 
   [0.013]     [0.024]       
Observations 8,372  8,372 8,860 8,860 8,860  8,860 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Col 1-2 report ordered probit with 
dependent variable: Subjective Risk Assessment. Col 3-4 report probit with dependent variable: Ever 
Screened? Col 5-6 report probit with dependent variable: Did doctor recommend mammogram within  
last 12 months? All specifications control for ethnicity, age-dummies, education dummies, ratio of 
income to poverty (dummies).  
  
 
Table 7: Education and Response to Presence of Cancer in Family 




















0.036 -0.015  -0.007  0.007 0.100  -0.015  Breast 
Cancer * 
Education  (0.016)** (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.027)  (0.015)*** (0.015) 
0.028 0.027*  -0.007  0.012 -0.003  0.077  Colon  
Cancer * 
Education  (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.017)  (0.017)***
-0.017 -0.004  0.006  0.076 -0.039  -0.033  Cervical 
Cancer * 
Education  (0.031)  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.063)  (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 20,046  15,315  15,243  18,879  9,116  9,032 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%,   
*** significant at 1%. Column (1)-(4) report results from probits with dependent  
Variable indicator for whether an individual has ever received the respective  
Screen. Colonoscopies and Home Blood Stool tests are screens for colon cancer. 
Pap Smears are tests for cervical cancer. The results in columns (1)-(4) are 
from pooled Specifications across both 2000 and 2005. Columns (5) and (6) report 
results from ordered probits for subjective assessment of “low”, “average” or 
“high” individual cancer risks. These subjective assessments have only been 
elicited in the 2005 cancer control module for breast and colon cancer, 
but not for cervical cancer. Specifications include full sets of dummies for 
age, education, ethnicity, and income fully interacted with year dummies. 
Furthermore included are indicator variables for whether a direct relative had 
breast cancer, colon cancer, or cervical cancer. Reported above are the 





Table 8A: Dispersion in Individual Signal for Full Risk Model 
Completed Years 
















Table 8B: Dispersion in Individual Signal for Family Risk Model 
Completed Years 














Reported are the point estimates for the standard deviation of the 
signal by education level. The three measures of dispersion recorded 
are (from the bottom) the number of boot-strapped samples for which 
σs goes to infinity, the 95% confidence interval and the standard 
error conditional on observing a finite σs. 
  
Table 9: Demand Parameters (Full Risk Model) 
Education  ≤12 13-15 ≥16 





































































































































Reported are the point estimates and bootstrapped standard errors for the demand 
parameters (V,c) by education and age. These parameters are implied by 4
th order 
polynomials estimated to fit the screening probabilities conditional on education, 
age, Gail Index, and subjective risk.  
  
Table 10 Predicted minus Observed Screening by Education and Subjective Risk 
  Low Risk  Medium Risk  High Risk  Total 
≤12 -0.021  0.023  -0.061  -0.004 
13-15 -0.035  0.037  -0.006 0.005 
≥16 -0.010  0.048  0.026  0.026 
Total -0.023  0.035  -0.019 0.007 
Shown are the differences in predicted and observed screening rates conditional on  
education and subjective risk assessment. The predicted rates are obtained from the model  
allowing for both family and individual risk. A positive number indicates that the  
predicted screening rates are smaller than observed screening rates.  
Table 11 The response to individual risk: information or demand? 
Education  ≤12 13-15 ≥16 
 Baseline  Estimates 








 Counterfactual  Estimates 




















Reported are Probit coefficients on the Gail Index. The Probit specification includes a  
full set of age-dummies. The data for the base-line estimates is generated by taking 
the (age,Gail) distribution for each education level. We then apply the information 
and screening model from Section @ as well as the estimated parameters from tables 6 
and 7 to generate screening rates conditional on (age,gail,educ,age) and estimate the 
probit specification from this model. To obtain the counterfactual estimates we took 
the same (age, Gail) distributions as for the baseline estimates and applied the 





Table 12 Accounting for the Education Gradient in Screening: Information or Demand? 
Education  ≤12 13-15 ≥16 
 Baseline  Estimates 
(1) With estimated 
parameters   71.9% 77.0% 83.2% 
 Counterfactual  Estimates 
(2) With σs of educ=16  65.9%  73.5%  83.2% 
(3) With (V,s) of educ=16  87.1%  84.4%  83.2% 
(4) With (σs, (V,s)) of 
educ=16  85.2% 83.4% 83.2% 
Reported are mean screening rates by education and across various counterfactual 
specifications.   
Table 13: Education and Beliefs about Breast Cancer 
Education  % who agree with 
  “Prayer and God can 
Prevent Cancer”
1
“Breast Lumps do not need a 
Doctor”
2
% Scoring above Median on 
test of Breast Cancer 
Knowledge 
High School or Less  31%  4%  28% 
More than High School  8%  1%  55% 
Data from Sample of women in San Francisco who were screened for Breast Cancer. 
1: "If a person prays about it, God will protect her from getting cancer" 
2: "If a lump in a woman's breast is not bothersome, there is no need to consult a 
doctor”. 